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Abstract 
This paper is aimed at relating income fluctuation with adoptable innovations, adopter category 
and their access to some variables than those explained in the neoclassical economics principle 
of labor market demand and supply equilibrium. Using a quantitative and qualitative case study 
of some farmers in two States, we considered whether respondents are earning enough income 
and what constraints they face. The von Hipple’s lead user concept and decision model of risk 
aversion under uncertainty were used to explain causes of variability. 
Notably, farmers with enough steady income have access to market, various information and are 
less risk averse. 
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1.  Introduction 
The causes of income fluctuation and inequality among individuals of the same locality, different 
or same occupation have since attracted the interest of economic scholars. The theory of factor 
market reveals that the demand and supply for labor determines how high or low workers earn. 
By implication, more productive workers receive higher income than less productive workers. 
The  assumption  has  resulted  in  categorizing  individuals  into  possessing  certain  abilities  or 
qualities that distinguish them from others viz: hard or lazy worker, smart or dull, strong or 
weak, outgoing or awkward and other personal characteristics. One assumption is that so long as 
the individual’s marginal contribution to the economy is positive, his(er) income remains stable. 
Arguably therefore, hard and diligent work attracts better reward than the contrary. 
Farm households also experience income fluctuations and inequality even to a larger degree 
compared with salaried workers as their business entails more risk and uncertainty. The rate of 
fluctuation  varies  between  farmers  in  developed  and  developing  countries  regardless  the 
numbers of hours they spend on the farm, how smart or dull they are, how strong or weak as well 
as effort expanded. A holistic understanding of this trend do not rest wholly on the concept of 
hard and lazy worker, smart and dull worker concept, nor can it find explanation only in policies 
that  promote  the  provision  of  technical  innovations,  subsidies  or  insurance  policy  against 
climatic risk. Even when governments initiate some policy framework to solve the problem of 2 
 
income variability, rather than resolve the situation, some of such policies have shown evidence 
of exacerbating the variability more than imaginable (Ahmed and Bernard, 1998, Walker et al. 
1983).  Moreover,  persuading  farmers  especially  in  developing  countries  to  buy  insurance 
premium against climatic or other production and market risk is quite a complex and herculean 
task. This is because farmers do not trust insurance companies to deliver on their promises. 
Information asymmetry is high among farmers, insurance agents and the government, thereby 
presenting institutional flaws. 
Mankiw (2002) added yet another twist to the debate of attribute-effect on income fluctuation by 
arguing that certain physical qualities such as looks and appearances play a correlating role. He 
brought to bear the case of movie actors, advertisers, sport stars, etc, and noted that actors with 
good looks, appearances and more humorous, tend to earn higher income than their colleagues in 
the same profession. By extension, if they neglect to maintain such qualities, they may cease to 
be a target for big producers. Similarly when talented sports stars neglect to train and keep fit; 
their income level during that period will fluctuate. This argument can be sustained and accepted 
for the case Mankiw presented, but whether such can be applicable to farmers poses a rather 
difficult dilemma, except if we extend it to the market environment of the farmers. 
Arguably, even among farmers of relatively comparable qualities such as very hard working and 
good  looking,  there  still  exists  persistent  income  variability  among  them.  Obviously,  it  is 
possible that productive-enhancing innovations can be available; however farmers need to be 
aware  of  its  existence,  and  how  it  works  technically  and  commercially.  On  the  other  hand, 
innovation awareness requires as next step, accepting and applying it. This is a risky decision but 
it can also be rewarding in the long and short run, all things being equal, because early adopters 
capture the initial gain, signaling income increase, decrease or stability. In developing countries, 
not all product quantity translates into income generation. Some may not get to the appropriate 
market in good condition or at the right time. This implicitly suggests the existence of other 
contributory factors being responsible for income fluctuation. The purpose of this paper is to 
empirically explore and identify such factors with the following questions: Do income levels 
over time depend on hard work alone? Does access to Information enable farmers overcome their 
problems  and  thus,  have  more  stable  income?  If  such  is  the  case,  how  relevant  are  the 
information being received? Is there a connection between information and market access with 
income stability? What motivates farmers to accept information content? How does attribute 
contribute to income level especially for farmers? 
Empirically, we noted that access to various forms of information relating to farming activities 
and marketing as well as physical market had an influence on income level. We also observed 
that  income  stabilization  cannot  be  accomplished  only  through  insurance  policy  framework 
against some insurable risk, especially in developing countries due to some missing links.  
Consequently, farmers who are more willing and ready to try an innovation without necessarily 
first observing other farmers practice it (less risk averse) make more stable income than others.  
However, government policies in some instances played negative roles, worsening the situation.  
 
2.  Review of some Literature on Income Fluctuation and Inequality 
The problem of income fluctuation and inequality has been a source of worry to economists in 
every dispensation.  Labor, as a factor of production in the concept of marginal product theory, is 
believed to earn an income in proportion to its marginal contribution to total production. The 
understanding  informed  economists  to  distinguish  individuals  with  certain  capabilities, 3 
 
experience, training, and possession of other inherent characteristics, to earn more income than 
others who possesses less of the recognized factors. Informed by such realization, government 
policies in some cases advocate human capital development through improved education and 
other  vocational  facilities  (Huffman,  2001,  Schultz,  1984,  Sundrum,  1992).  The  marginal 
product of labor theory has received wide criticisms (Blaug, 1997, Ehrenberg and Smith 1996). 
Mankiw, (2002) as well as Ehrenberg and Smith took a critical look at the opportunity cost of 
acquiring further education and the effect it has on income variability
1. Mankiw (2002) opined 
that based on incentives and how an individual react to risk, the long run benefit of acquiring 
additional education may be substituted for an immediate high income and prestige desire. While 
Sundrum  (1992)  reasoned  that  the  sources  of  income  variability  especially  in  developing 
countries are correlated to their educational attainment. Huffman, (2001) was of the contrary 
view.  He  noted  especially  with  respect  to  agricultural  productivity,  that  education  may  be 
productive  or  unproductive  depending  on  economic  conditions  prevalent  in  such  a  society. 
However, Walker et al. (1983) in their research observed that education is responsible for income 
variability only on instance that farmers take up additional employment especially during low 
productivity  and  adverse  environmental  condition.  Agrawal  et  al.  (1970)  also  noted  that 
education or some form of training such as the ability to handle some agricultural machinery 
constitutes a source of income variability. Several analyses of income variability are basically 
hinged on equilibrium model of labor market, which entails that income should adjust to balance 
labor demand and supply (Binswanger, 1980, Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997, Sundrum, 1992). But 
this is not always the case (Mankiw, 2002). Cruces and Sticerd (2005), Ahmed and Bernard 
(1989) and Walker et al. (1983) demonstrate some deviation. While Fortman (1997) cautioned 
that  not  paying  attention  to  cultural,  legal,  political  and  other  factors  is  capable  of 
misrepresenting reality in the quest too explain income inequality and stabilization mechanism. 
In this paper, we intend to explore the ‘other factors’ which can impact on adopters’ income 
level.    Income  in  agricultural  business,  among  other  factors,  depends  on  the  availability, 
affordability and adoptability of technical innovations. The use of such technical innovation can 
lead to income variability among farmers because early adoption signals improved income for 
the first users all things being equal. Subsequently, wide spread of its usage is capable of leading 
to price reduction of the ensuing product. Against this backdrop, Binswanger (1980) pointed out 
that the green revolution created some inequalities both on income and access among farmers. 
This is because not all farmers adopt an innovation at the same time and speed irrespective of 
their level of education or some other pronounced abilities. Occasionally, less educated farmers 
adopt innovation faster and become innovators (Tchawa et al. 2001)
2. Despite the potential of 
agricultural innovations and its promise to abate income variability to adopters, there are still 
some  elements  of  uncertainty  (Tidd  et  al.  2003).  Also  despite  several  policy  measures 
implemented in some developing countries, income variability is still a big problem. For this 
purpose, it is imperative to question why such trend has persisted. 
 
2.1.  Income Fluctuation: Why has it Persisted? 
Income variability among farmers especially in the developing countries have persisted in spite 
of several policy measures that have been implemented. The trend sometimes assumes a kind of 
                                                           
1 The term income variability and income fluctuation are used interchangeably in this paper, in several instances, income variability is preferred 
because it encompasses both inequality and fluctuation and both problem are addressed in this paper. 
2 In this work, Paul Tchawa and his team reported of a farmer who was formerly a taxi driver-turned innovator. 4 
 
cobweb circle. Why has such phenomenon continued? Obviously it is not the case of farmers in 
developing countries being lazy, majority of them especially in Nigeria work very hard, spending 
about  ten  hours  man  labor  per  day  on  their  farm,  in  contrast,  they  earn  less  income.  Also, 
government  has  introduced  certain  policy  measures  aimed  at  reducing  income  fluctuation 
especially  among  rural  low-income  farmers  through  price  policy,  introduction  of  new 
innovations or some form of restriction. In developed countries, income stabilization can also 
take the form of insurance policies to compensate farmers against all insurable risks that causes 
fluctuation. However, Walter-Jorgensen (1987) counseled that correcting income variability in 
agriculture through  price  policy is only beneficial  to efficient farmers  with  large  production 
capacities and as such, will still increase income variability. This line of argument is also shared 
by Binswanger (1980). The failure of the green revolution era especially in some developing 
countries was because it targeted the wrong people, and was a cluster innovation which required 
other inputs to succeed. The desired lessons for correcting income variability occasionally seem 
elusive because some of the intended policy measures tend to worsen the situation as is evident 
below. 
 
2.2.  The ‘Grow Cassava’ Initiative to Correct income Variability 
As part of her effort to improve income stability among rural farmers, the Nigerian Government 
disbursed  N50  Billion  (about  $420  Million)  in  2006  through  the  Special  Program  on  Food 
Security  (SPFS)  (now  metamorphosed  into  National  Program  on  Food  Security).  Because 
emphasis  then  was  on  cassava  production  due  to  its  industrial  usage  and  export  potentials, 
cassava varieties with high yielding and industrial usage were introduced to farmers. As the case 
may be, farmers were motivated by profit maximization and increased income. Hence, several of 
them obtained the loan (which was administered with about 10% interest rate) and embarked on 
large scale cassava production (for those who have more land). During the harvest peak season, 
cassava traded for approximately N40, 000 per Pick-up load 
3(about $336). As more harvest 
poured  into  the  market  without  appropriate  mechanism  to  absorb  or  manage  the  surge,  the 
economic principle of demand and supply set in to determine price. The resultant effect was that 
cassava price particularly in Oyo state fluctuated till it dropped by 55% within the same harvest 
season. Although the price of a Pick-up load of cassava remained almost stable in other states 
such as Imo state (also varied within Oyo state), several cassava farmers in Oyo state could not 
repay their loans, they were also forced to sell their product at the going market rate, essentially 
to meet food need of their family and other household commitments. Majority of them were 
coerced to repay the loan, or hide when they noticed the SPFS officers coming
4. This incident 
informed us, among other deductions:  
a.  That in some cases, farmers do not intentionally wish to default loan repayment. 
b.  Sometimes, some policies aimed at correcting income variability actually amplify it. 
c.  Income  stabilization  modules  should  not  focus  entirely  on  increased  production  or 
insurance against climatic risk. 
d.  Encouraging farmers to increase production do not essentially correct income fluctuation 
and inequality without other mechanisms in place, this statement may appear plausible. 
                                                           
3 A Pick-up load of cassava is approximately 1.5 Tons, the measurement is not standardized, the cassava tubers are packed into the pickup till it is 
“over-flowing”, an expert loader can load more tubers than non-expert, therefore due to the unstandardized measurement, farmers’ may not get 
the actual price of the worth of their product depending on the loading. 
4 One of the Oyo ADP officers that worked with us was in charge of the SPFS program. For those who had repaid their loans, they were willing 
to meet with us, while the contrary is the case for others who had not. In some instances, his presence either acted as incentive or disincentive. 5 
 
The relationship between innovations, adoption, adopter categories and income fluctuation is 
depicted  on  the  diagram  below.  The  income  line  is  a  curve  in  nature  (originating  from 
adoption of innovation by adopter categories), indicating that in many cases, government 
efforts  to  reduce  income  fluctuation  actually  increases  it  and  sometimes  the  trends  are 
repetitive, therefore the arc could form a complete cycle depending on policy framework.  
                           
                                 
 
Figure.1 Adoptable Innovation
5 and Income fluctuation-cause link 
 
The adoption of innovations can result to income increase or decrease to the adopter; therefore 
innovation’s  attributes  are  very  significant  to  determine  adoption  rate.  However,  even  when 
innovation attributes are compatible to the felt needs of the user community (Röling, 1988), the 
actual decision to adopt is still complex and in practice, not all farmers adopt at the same time 
and rate, showing differences in adopter categories (Rogers and Burdge, 1972).  In the instance 
where an individual’s motive to adopt an innovation is economic reason, access to market and 
market information is very crucial. Income fluctuation therefore is affected by other endogenous 
and  exogenous  variables.  The  endogenous  variables  are  those  variables  which  concern  the 
adopter, such as formal and informal training, perceptions and reactions, personal attributes and 
dispositions, skills and production capabilities (Albach, 1994, Mankiw, 2002, Rogers, 1983). 
While  the  exogenous  factors  are  those  that  are  outside  the  control  of  the  adopter,  such  as 
externalities, social factors, climatic, environmental, institutional, access to information, finance, 
market  and  other  facilities,  political  and  policy  environment  and  production  techniques 
(Binswanger, 1980, Roumasset et al. 1979 , Walker et al. 1983).  
 
2.3.  How Discrimination and Politics Play roles in income Variability 
Theoretically,  effort  and  ability  play  vital  role  in  income  stability.  The  probability  for  hard 
working, innovative farmers to earn higher and more stable income than others is an acceptable 
dogma. Notably, chance can play a role as well as attitude of government institutions. However, 
the  ideology  of  how  discrimination  or  ethnicity  constitutes  income  variability  in  agriculture 
poses  a  serious  debate.  For  employed  labor,  Mankiw  (2002)  noted  that  factors  such  as 
discrimination,  gender,  ethnicity,  political  inclination,  etc.  all  affect  income.  He  however 
                                                           
5 Adoptable innovation represent those innovation that possesses both the subjective and objective attributes, in order words, they are user 
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cautioned that these factors do not say it all. As controversial and debatable this issue tends to 
portray, it overtly impact on income variability, take for instance the case of fertiliser. 
Farmers  in  developing  countries  majorly  depend  on  fertiliser  application  for  increased 
production. This can be due to soil fertility depletion or the fact that some improved varieties 
require  high  fertiliser  application  for  optimum  yield.  Fertiliser  availability,  affordability, 
composition and distributional timing to the farmers are very important. In Nigeria, the popular 
fertiliser being distributed to farmers is the NPK 15:15:15 even though research has been shown 
that the best composition of NKP fertiliser for optimum crop yield for farmers in South Eastern 
Nigeria is the NPK 20:10:10 (Meyen et al. 1996), NPK 15:15:15 is still widely in use due to 
political reasons. Moreover, before the fertiliser and other planting materials can reach farmers, 
their appropriate use time may have elapsed. Some states receive planting materials on time 
while others do not, programs such as the Fadama users association, which targets dry season 
production, was started in the Northern Nigeria, although the message is presently being spread 
nationally. Moreover, majority of the farmers interviewed noted that inputs are not delivered to 
them at the appropriate time and quantity; this is linked to politics, bureaucracy and corruption. 
 
3.  Empirical Data 
The empirical data for this paper was collected in Oyo and Imo states in the Southern part of 
Nigeria as part of a six-state case study research work, covering the six geo-political division of 
the country. The practical aim of the study is to determine what factors will affect sustainable 
adoption  of  biotechnology  innovation  in  developing  countries  especially  Nigeria.  Farmers’ 
utility,  food  security,  and  income  depend  on  availability,  affordability,  usability  and 
manageability of agricultural innovation, vis-à-vis the marketability of its product. Data were 
collected,  in  collaboration  with  the  state  ADPs,  through  structured  questionnaire,  personal 
interviews and participant observation during meetings with farmers and other stakeholders. 
The data used in this analysis are from 640 farmers made up of 40 farmers each from 2 villages 
in 4 Local Government Areas for each state (LGAs). The data was designed to ascertain whether 
respondents make enough income, their source of livelihood, constraints to stable income, what 
will motivate them to adopt a new innovation. Ostensibly also to determine if they have access to 
market and necessary information for overcoming farming constraints, attitude to risk (Albach, 
1994, Clark and Akinbode, 1968),  and to determine the so-called lead users, (von Hippel, 1988).  
 
3.1.  Income variability Measurement 
From some empirical work, the most widely used measures of income variability are the Gini 
coefficient  (Thompson  and  von  Witzke,  1986,  Sundrum,  1992),  Coefficient  of  variation 
(Binswanger, 1980), Variance, (Carlino and Sill, 2000, Walker et al. 1983), Welfare function or 
Welfare  approach  (Kingma  and  Oskam  1986,  Sundrum,  1992),  some  uses  a  combination  of 
measures (Sundrum, 1992). Cruces and Sticerd (2005) employed ex-ante and ex-post concept of 
risk aversion under uncertainty  developed by  Atkinson (1970), to explain how choice under 
uncertainty  in  a  social  setting  can  cause  inequality.  Atkinson  argued  that  both  the  Gini 
coefficient, the variance or the relative mean deviation measurement for income inequality are 
misleading. Boussard (1976) altered the expectation and variance (E.V) model of Markowitz. 
Notable point in his transformation is that the risk aversion coefficient depends on the character 7 
 
(attributes) and mood (probably together with the environment) of the decision maker. Preferring 
one measurement over the other is a matter of choice and orientation
6 
 
3.2.  Environment and Income Variability 
The  figures  below  illustrate  some  typical  environment  where  most  farmers  in  developing 




Fig.2 Market situation      Fig.3      Fig.4  Fig.5 production environment 
 
Figures 2-4 represents a typical local market, figures 2, 3 and 4 are groundnut, cassava and 
pepper respectively, displayed for customers to buy. The products are spread on the dusty and 
dirty floor, with people walking by, therefore the tendency of quality and grade reduction are not 
unlikely. Moreover, since the markets operate in open space with little or no stalls, incomes 
during extreme weather conditions is affected due to wastage. In some instances, the market 
locations are in remote places with no access road, farmers transport their produce with Pick-up 
trucks  or  Lorries.  Such  market  environment  will  obviously  affect  the  mood  of  the  farmers, 
making them more aggressive. Also the price will be affected because of product quality, while 
lack of information regarding the market situation will increase risk and uncertainty (Feder and 
Slade, 1984). Fig.5 is a dry season vegetable production with no clean water irrigation, with the 
farmers using hoes and cutlass as production implement. Although they spend an average of ten 
hours daily in their farms, production is low, income is low.  The crucial question then is how to 
stabilize income given the kind of production and market environment observed above and the 
preceding constraints in table 1. Although some authors advocate for insurance modules against 
risks that causes fluctuation (Burgaz, 2000), such system can work only where there is relatively 
perfect  agricultural  market,  information  sharing  between  government  institutions,  insurance 
companies  and  farmers,  institutional  environment  that  enforces  the  rule  of  the  game  and 
sustainable policy framework. Such are not the case in many developing countries. Receiving 
insurance claims are very ambiguous; there are questionable trust between farmers and insurance 
companies due to information asymmetry.  Some of the major constraints facing the farmers and 
information relevance regarding their solution are shown below. 
Table.1 respondent’s source of livelihood, constraints and information access (n = 640) 
     Source of livelihood               Constraints (Con)/n (n multiple choices)    Info access solution 
Category  n  %  Con  n  %  %share  Con  n  %  %share  Category  n  % 
Farming  362  56.6  A  338  52.8  9.2  F  451  70.5  12.3  Yes  94  14.7 
C/servant  54  8.4  B   338  60.6  10.6  G  483  75.5  13.2  No  239  37.3 
                                                           
6 In this analysis, we used Grafstat software for two variable analyses to determine relationships. More information on Grafstat can be found on 
www.forschen-mit-grafstat.de 8 
 
F&C/S  107  16.7  C  461  72.0  12.6  H  398  62.2  10.9  Not as I  275  43.0 
others  117  18.3  D  469  73.3  12.8  I  136  21.3  3.7  Do not    32  5.0 
      E  205  32.0  5.6  J  338  52.8  9.2       
  Total possible nominations  3667      
Where: C/servant = Civil servant,  F&C/S = farming and civil servant, A = Lack of fund or capital, B = Good 
quality chemicals, insecticides and vet drugs, C = Weed problem/Pests and diseases, D = Lack of improved seeds, 
high cost of animal feeds/improved seeds, E = Lack of modern equipment/high cost of hiring them, F = Fertilizer 
availability and affordability, G = Labor shortage/cost, Land depletion/access, good road, Marketing problems, H = 
Lack of processing/storage facilities, transportation problems, I = High mortality rate of animals, adulterated drugs, 
cost of drugs, knowledge of usage, J = Others (Water shortage, information access, drought, Health problem, food 
insecurity, flooding, Do Not = Do not know who to consult, Not as I = not as I wanted, %share = share of total Con. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the source of livelihood, the constraints affecting the income level and the 
information being received for their solutions. Problems of weeds, pest and diseases are more 
prevalent among them as shown by the % share of total constraints. Regardless that farmers are 
not  receiving  enough  information  on  how  to  overcome  their  farming  constraints  or  the 
information is not as they wanted it, the relevance of such information are also questionable, this 
is depicted on the graph below. 
   
                 
Fig.6 Information relevance relative to problem solution 
 
The  major  sources  of  information  available  to  farmers  with  respect  to  overcoming  their 
constraints are extension agents, cooperative meetings, neighbors, NGOs, other government and 
non-government instructions. Farmers’ cooperatives are relatively organised in the state (86.3 %) 
are members of cooperatives; some are structured into various commodity and activity group. 
About 44 % participated in cooperative activities often while 22.1 % participated very often. 
Information disseminated in their meetings
7 are appertaining to their farming and social needs. 
Surprisingly, the prerequisite that the Government set which farmers must fulfill in order to 
participate in the N50 Billion loan was that recipients must belong to a cooperative group. This 
reason  may  have  accounted  for  the  explanation  why  several  of  them  became  members. 
Notwithstanding, information trust index (IT-index)
8 farmers attached to cooperative activities 
are quite high. 52.7 % of the farmers showed willingness to accept and utilise the information 
content,  however,  46.3  %  noted  that  the  information  content  are  helpful  but  not  adequate.  
Although several other underlying motives could account for membership and participation in 
                                                           
7 We took part in several of such meetings. Whether the criteria set by the government before farmers could obtain the loan is efficient or turned 
the cooperatives into political environment is not the focus of this paper. 
8 IT-index is the level of trust in a scaled format; the farmers have on different information sources and on preferred ranking, who they will 
contact when faced with problems.  
A: Satisfactory, B: Not satisfactory, C: 
Not as I wanted, D: Can not say if I am 
satisfied, E: Other comments 9 
 
cooperative activities, the major part relate to information content being received  from such 
meetings. Using a ranking method to determine why farmers join and participate in cooperative 
activities, the option; Organizational structure addresses farming needs ranked first with a mean 
of  1.48  (55.0  %),  while  the option;  information  disseminated  are relevant  to farming  needs, 
ranked second with a mean of 1.61 (52.0 %). 
Another method used in determining the IT-index of cooperative membership was to consider 
the category of stakeholders that farmers consult for their problem solution.             
When farmers face problems constraining their production and income level, they consult others 
for solution. The quest for information on problem can be observed through the level and extent 
of consultation farmers undertake when faced with constraints. IT-index varies depending on 
past experience, farmers’ attitude and the potential benefit of such information. Although farmers 
still consult with extension agents because they are presumed to have some training, they are 
skeptical about them as a result of previous failed government promises. 
 
3.3.  Market Information and Income variability 
From part 3.2, we concentrated on  IT-index on problem solution, cooperative and  extension 
agent; our next discussion is the marketing aspect. In fig.2-4, we showed an illustration of some 
market  environment  where  several  farmers  in  developing  countries  earn  their  income. 
Noteworthly,  the  most  remarkable  driving  force  for  innovation  adoption  by  farmers  are 
economic reasons. Economic reasons entail meeting their food requirements as well as sell the 
remaining to meet other needs. Such market environments are depicted in fig.2-4. Table 4 below 
illustrates the type of changes farmers would desire to be effected in the output market.  
Table 4 Output market change preference (n = 640) 
Category  R.s  Ranking  %  Mean  Median 
Pref. BP  371  1
st  58.0  1.66  1 
Pref. IPC  205  2
nd  32.0  2.29  2 
Pref. SPP  380  4
th  59.4  3.22  4 
Pref. AMP  247  3
rd  38.6  2.83  3 
Where R.s = response share of ranked preference priority, Pref. BP, IPC, SPP AMP = better price for product, better 
information about price changes, stable price for product and available market for product respectively 
 
The output market is neither satisfactory, nor efficient and to the farmers’ benefit. Farmers do 
not get appropriate price for their product due to market failures, lack of market information, 
lack of storage facilities especially when product prices are relatively low, poor road network to 
reach the appropriate market, poor grading and packaging facilities. For this and other reasons, 
there is need to institute changes as indicated in table 4. These constraints and others accounted 
for the variability in income which is demonstrated in the graph below.                                                                                            
                                                     
        Fig. 7. Income variability 10 
 
Enough income (EI) is represented by four categories of income level, those who are making 
enough (yes), those who are not making it as they wanted (not as I want), those who are not 
really making enough income (not really) and those with no enough income (No). As is evident 
from figure 7, the variability is somewhat evenly distributed, with 5% level difference between 
the upper and lower limit. These Enough Income levels are denoted by +1, +1/2, +1/3 and 0 
respectively. (This can also be taken as higher, middle, lower and bottom levels in that order). 
The highest constraints faced by majority of the farmers are presented in table 1 of page 6. 
92.16% of them belonged to one cooperative group or the other for several motives. What then is 
accountable for differences in EI? This kind of scenario requires further elucidation. 
 
4.  Discussion: What are the Possible Causes for the Observed Variability? 
Why  does  income  variability  persist  in  the  same  natural,  institutional,  technological  and 
economic environment with some people having so to say ‘equal opportunity’? Several works 
have been carried out on income variability; there has not been a one clear cut answer to the 
problem. More light is shed here for this phenomenon by comparing EI with other variables. 
 
Table 5 Enough Income (EI) vs. Infoaccess (IA) (n = 640) 
Infoaccess↓→ EI  Yes(1)%  Not as I wanted(1/2) %    Not really(1/3) %   No(0) %    IA% 
Yes             63.1  6.4  1.6  0.0  14.7 
No     0.8  6.4  44.3  79.5  37.3 
Not as I would want it  35.4  85.0  47.6  11.9  43.0 
Problem: who to consult  0.8  2.1  6.5  8.7  5.0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
 
In table 5, 14.7 % of those who had Infoaccess made enough stable income representing 63.1 % 
of the entire sample size. Only 0.8 % made enough stable income among the 37.3 % who did not 
have  Infoaccess while  among  those  in  category  +1/2  of  EI, (35.4  %),  43.0  % did  not  have 
Infoaccess as they would have wanted it. Next, we compared market access (MA). 
Access to market (also credit market, Ahmed and Bernard (1989) have covariate relationship to 
EI, the grow cassava campaign resulted in income variability due to MA problem, while the 
price of cassava was high in other states, both farmers and consumers were denied the economic 
benefit of increased cassava production due to lack of MA. Improving MA is a possible solution. 
Table 6 Enough Income (EI) vs. Market Access (MA) (n = 640) 
MA↓→ EI  Yes %  Not as I wanted %  Not really %  No %  MA% 
Yes             90.0  17.9  1.6  0.5  22.8 
No     0.0  2.9  21.1  80.0  29.8 
Not completely  9.2  65.0  11.4  2.2  20.0 
Once in a while  0.8  14.3  66.0  16.8  27.2 
Other comments  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.2 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 6 is a representation of EI vs. MA. 22.8 % of the sample size had access to market, from 
this figure, 90.0 % fall into the first category of EI. Those who had market access once in a while 
only represent 0.8 % of +1 EI. 29.8% did not have MA; they occupied the 0 category of +1 EI. 
Similar analyses were conducted on Inforelevance (information relevance IR), suggestion for 
output market improvement and the reason for adopting a new innovation. For the Inforelevance, 
only 12.2 % were satisfied with the information being received, 56.9 % of this figure represented 11 
 
the category +1 of EI. In essence, only those who regarded the information as being satisfactory, 
or not really as they would have wanted it to be, earned appreciable income. For improvement in 
the output market, better information about price changes ranked 2
nd in order of priority, majority 
of those who constituted this ranking are among the +1EI level. This is also applicable with 
preference to available market for their product which ranked 3
rd.  
 
4.1.  Enough Income (EI) Compared with Adopter Category and Risk Averse 
So far, exogenous variables on EI have been compared. In this section, we make a connection 
between EI, rate of innovation adoption and risk averseness among individuals. Innovativeness 
in  any  field  of  business  increases  market  share,  new  products  are  engine  for  capturing  and 
retaining market shares, profitability and competitiveness. Many organizations channel much of 
their activities into this orientation. Conversely, not all organizations or societies innovate at the 
same time and rate. As with organizations, so it is also with individuals who make up such 
organization or society, some are more ready to take risk while others are not. However, those 
who take the risk tend to capture the initial profit as they are small to influence the market price 
(Rogers, 1983, Tidd et al. 2003 and Utterback, 1996). Moreover, when faced with relatively 
comparable  alternatives,  some  individuals  tend  to  choose  the  less  risky  alternative.  The 
expectation and variance (E.V) model try to explain how individuals make alternative choice in 
the midst of uncertainty. The more risk averse an individual is, the less likely that he or she will 
choose an alternative whose probable outcome in terms of utility increase is less. This is depicted 
in the table below. 
Table 7 Adopter Category (AC) v. Enough Income (n = 640) 
AC↓→ EI  Yes(1)%  Not as I wanted(1/2) %  Not really(1/3) %  No(0)%  AC% 
Innovators                      91.5                              7.9  3.8  1.1  21.7 
Late adopters                   1.5                            11.4  80.0  9.7  28.8 
Laggards  1.5                              2.1  11.4  87.6  29.4 
Early adopters  5.4                            78.6  4.9  1.6  20.2 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Categorization of adopter group in table 7 is for the purpose of linking it with theoretical concept 
of adoption. This corresponds to; started applying it immediately, waited till I received more 
information, waited till I observed other farmers adopt it and first verified if the information is 
correct and relevant respectively in our original data. Among the 21.7% who are adopters, 91.5 
% represent category +1 of EI, 7.8 % for category EI +1/2,  and 3.8 % for category +1/3 EI. 
By  analyzing  also  what  motivated  them  into  adopting  some  particular  innovation,  it  was 
observed that for the category +1 EI level, the main reason is because it addressed their specific 
needs rather than conflict with belief or the risk involved, implying that they take risk if it meets 
their specific needs, they also consider future economic and environmental impact of innovation. 
 
4.2.  What does this Imply? 
An individual’s or organization’s determination to constantly innovate increases market shares, 
the more the market share, the more apparent a stable EI level. However, not all farmers innovate 
at the same rate as evidenced in the theory of adoption. For adoption to take place, the farmers 
have  to  be  aware  of  the  innovation  (information  seeking),  its  technical  and  commercial 
workability as well as actual market access to sell the product. Even where these variables are 
available, the explicit decision to adopt varies from individual to individual. Such trend leads to 12 
 
income  variability  among  farmers.  Even  though  some  policies  may  address  innovation 
availability, the actual decision to adopt is an exclusive right of the user. The ability to take 
appropriate-timely decision is vital and this may depend on some certain inherent attributes of 
the user too. 
von Hippel (1988) introduced the concept of the lead users with the following characteristics: 
a)  They show familiarity with their conditions presently and also have accurate perception 
of future needs. (due to information seeking and processing) 
b)  Have real experiences which make it possible to project future market condition. 
c)  Have relatively high expectation of utility from problem solution. 
d)  Have tried on their own to solve the problem, they have an understanding of how and 
what to expect. 
e)  Can serve as need forecasters in the future market trend and market research. 
f)  Their risk aversion is relatively small due to their quest to higher return. 
It may appear plausible to say that those with EI level of +1 and +1/2 have some special abilities 
evident in their capacity to be less risk averse, more apt to source for information on problem 
solution. Their consultation level for problem solution and quest for market access (MA) is high. 
Walker  et  al.  (1983)  indeed  noted  that  risk  aversion  have  covariate  implication  on  income 
variability. However, the challenge of having the right information, enabling facilities such as 
storage, processing and MA at the appropriate time and place also posses another conceptual 
problem. Although hard work and training is  also indispensable, farmers noted that their EI 
levels are affected because they lacked the knowledge to use certain innovations, some elements 
can be missing still. Again, government may embark of large scale introduction of ‘appropriate 
innovation’  in  order  to  stabilize  income,  such  policies  have  shown  evidence  of  further 
contribution to making income variability cyclic, especially if adequate measure are not taking to 
provide relevant information and market access to the target farmers.  Adoptable innovations 
result  in  high  Enough  Income  for  those  adopting  it.  However,  despite  how  user-friendly  an 
innovation may be presumed, the actual decision to adopt is quite complex. Even when farmers 
show risk averseness, they may do so with previous experience. Previous disappointment can 




4.3.  Summary 
Admittedly, causes of income variability posses a rather conceptual dilemma and the method of 
correcting it more problematic and inexhaustible. Without being polemic, we have nevertheless 
in this paper, endeavored to reduce the inexhaustible list of possible solutions. We have argued 
that abilities are relevant tools in determining income as well as education especially where it 
concerns the use of technical innovation and also like Walker et al. (1983) noted, where farmers 
take up alternative employment to enable them earn additional income. We have also argued that 
providing adoptable innovations can raise income level for  rural farmers, however, we have 
warned that in some instances, such policy dimensions usually fail to address other fundamental 
problems of how to absorb the surge in increased production thereby making income variability a 
rather cyclic phenomenon. The grow cassava campaign by the Nigerian government being an 
example,  as  more  farmers  will  tend  to  reduce  cassava  production  during  the  next  cropping 
season, the shortage in supply in the season will increase  price and the trend will be repeated. 13 
 
Invariably,  we  have  shown  that  discrimination  and  political  environment  can  cause  income 
fluctuation,  these  have  been  demonstrated  in  the  case  of  NKP  fertiliser,  availability  and 
affordability of farming inputs. Farmers who get such inputs on time improve their production 
and hence possible income increase while those who get it late may suffer poor harvest and 
hence lower income in such farming season. 
Most  notably,  we  have  systematically  demonstrated  that  adoption  of  technical  innovation 
presents a risky and uncertainty scenario and only those whose risk averseness is relatively low 
venture into it. Such individuals are the lead-users, they capture the initial profit and control the 
market till others join, hence may enjoy a stable income. Notwithstanding, we opined that the 
lead-users also depend on available information for new innovations as well as available market 
to  sell  their  product.  Diverse  information  for  farming  activities  is  incentives  to  knowledge 
increase, thus reducing risk and uncertainty which invariable have a bearing on income stability. 
 Access  to adoptable  innovations, market,  information and personal  attributes  of  the  adopter 
impacts on income stabilization. The following suggestions are some measures that could reduce 
income fluctuation especially in developing countries. 
a.  Any  policy  framework  to  increase  production  should  take  cognisance  of  the  product 
market, where such market is lacking; effort should be made to initiate one. 
b.  Provision of processing and storage facilities to take care of excess production. Farmers 
in  developing  countries  loss much  of  their  production  due  to  lack  of  processing  and 
storage facilities, this is one major causes of income fluctuation. 
c.  Provide access to market information, problem solution information and other possible 
relevant  information  to  farmers.  Information  flow  increases  knowledge  and  relevant 
knowledge regarding farming activities reduces risk. 
d.  Reduce  risk  and  uncertainty  in  agriculture  by  providing  adoptable  innovations. 
Innovations that are user specific and environmental specific as well as their timing of 
availability have a positive effect on income stabilization. 
 
Annex 
Following  the  example  of  Adams,  Jr.  and  He  (1995)  on  a  different  approach,  we  therefore 
suggests that EI is a function of access to adoptable innovations, access to information, market, 
ability of the adopter, less constraint and other institutional factors. This is called the AIIMA 
function (Adoptable innovation, Information, Market and other Access) 
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Where: ¶ = partial change in 
Ina= innovation access (from 1 to z innovation),  Ifa = information access,  Ifr = information relevance,  Mka  = 
market access,  Ac = Adopter category,  = At Attributes (personal attributes of adopters, risk and others),  f C = 
mean constraints by farmers,  nf C = mean constraints by non farmers,  b  = number of observable constraints, N = 
(f –nf) = total number of farmers and non farmers. 14 
 
To calculate EI.I1, we consider three different innovations introduced by the Oyo ADP from 
2003 to 2006 with its adoption rate given below. 
Table 8 Agric innovations disseminated to farmers from 2003 to August 2006 
no  innovation  % adoption  Share sample
x  
1  Use of dry poultry manure for vegetable production  90  288 
2  Row planting of leafy vegetable for better management  30  96 
2  Use of sweet potato as cover crop for soil conservation  20  64 
 
Source: Oyo ADP, 
x Own estimation based on sample size 
 
For  EI  level  for  first  innovation,  we  consider  adoption  by  farmers  and  those  who  practice 
farming with other occupation. We compute the partial difference in Infoaccess, Inforelevance, 
market  access,  attributes,  adopter  category,  and  constraints.  This  was  done  by  comparing 
occupation with these variables mentioned above using Grafstat. 
 EI.I1 for three category occupation =  
Ina(288 – 28) +  Ifa (149.5 – 67) +  Ifr (106.16 – 90) + Mka(155.83 – 36) +  Ac (130.49 – 74) + 
At (218) -  f C (163.9) - b(30)   = 559.52 




 = 1.91 
EI.I2 enough income for the second innovation I2 
Adoption share for I2 = 96, 
 EI.I2 = 
292
193.9 - 560.98
 = 1.26 
P (EI.I1) = 1 – EI.I1 = |1 – 1.91| = 0.91, P (EI.I2) = 0.26, P (EI.I3) = 0.15   
Where P (EI.I1) = probability function 
The higher the EI Level, the lower the variability 
For farmers alone 
EI.I1 = 
179
414.9 -   762.32
 = 1.94     EI.I2 = 
179
414.9   -   570.32
 = 0.87     EI.I3 =  
179
414.9   -   538.32
 = 0.69 
P (EI.I1) farmers alone = |1- 1.94| = .94, P (EI.I2) = -0.13, P (EI.I3) = -0.31 
 
In calculating EI level for the introduced innovation, other variables are held constant here, in 
reality, these variables changes in the course of adoption process due to the approach employed 
by  the  resource  community  to  disseminate  the  innovation,  a  lower  P(EI)  results  in  more 
variability. This calculation is repeated with adoption rate from other states and we observed 
similar trend depending on adoption rate. 
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